Asia’s new boat people Burma’s displaced people
The Rohingya minority: Exclusion and discrimination
Northern Arakan State is one of the main pockets of acute poverty and vulnerability in Burma.
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repeal or amend the 1982 Citizenship Law to ensure compliance of its legislation with the country’s international human rights obligations, including Article 7 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child and Article 9 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women;
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take urgent measures to eliminate discriminatory practices against the Muslim minority in North Rakhine [Arakan] State, and to ensure that no further discrimination is carried out against persons belonging to this community.
Burma’s Muslim Rohingya Minority Dwell at the “Brink of Extermination”
All the people of Burma are suffering at the hands of one of the world’s most brutal, and illegitimate, military regimes. From time to time Burma’s crisis hits the headlines, as it did with protests led by Buddhist monks last September, and Cyclone Nargis in May this year. In between such events, however, Burma fades from the world’s attention.
If Burma as a whole is under-reported, the people on its western borders are almost unknown to the world. Journalists, activists and aid agencies who visit the region tend to head for the Thailand-Burma border, where access to refugees, displaced people and democracy groups is greatest.
CAUGHT BETWEEN A CROCODILE AND A SNAKE
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Friday, 20 March 2009 | |
The Increasing Pressure on Rohingyas in Burma and Bangladesh
& Report of the fact-finding mission – April/May 2003 ColophonThe Burma Center Netherlands (BCN) is an independent foundation that aims to inform the Dutch society on developments in Burma. BCN initiates and coordinates activities that benefit democratisation, respect for human rights and sustainable development by lobby and advocacy on EU level. BCN also aims to contribute to a constructive dialogue between the various groups in Burma.
BURMA CENTER NETHERLANDSPaulus Potterstraat 201071 DA Amsterdam Tel : +31 (0) 20 6716952Fax : +31 (0) 20 6713513E-mail: bcn@xs4all.nlThis e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it Website: www.burmacenter.nl AUTHORPeter Ras PICTURESPeter Ras
1. From the author First of all, I am grateful to all representatives and individuals for the time and information they shared to support my research.
Second, many thanks to the organizations and individuals who concretely supported and helped me to visit all areas and locations of concern. Without them, I would not have had the opportunity to experience the actual reality of the Burmese Rohingya refugee population and their poor living conditions.
Last but not least, with utmost respect, I would like to thank the refugees and the representatives of Burmese (refugee) organisations who spent time to inform me about their real circumstances and the problems they face day to day. Their efforts to tell me their stories were certainly not always without serious personal risks.
BCN is impressed with the good work of so many organizations and individuals who go great lengths to render practical support to the refugees of the still continuing repression in Burma. BCN feels very inspired by the continuing commitment of so many Burmese refugees, to do whatever possible to contribute to the process towards democracy and reconciliation in Burma in general and Arakan State in particular.
Peter Ras, Coordinator, Burma Center Netherlands 2. Introduction “I was born in Burma, but the Burmese Government says I don’t belong there. I grew up in Bangladesh, but the Bangladesh Government says I cannot stay here. As a Rohingya, I feel I am caught between a crocodile and a snake.”From: 10 Years in Bangladesh, published by Médecins Sans Frontières, 2003
In April and May 2003, a representative of Burma Center Netherlands (BCN) undertook a fact-finding mission to Bangladesh and India. BCN organized this mission primarily because of serious concern about the situation of Burmese (Rohingya) refugees in Bangladesh. BCN has been alarmed by disturbing stories about the changing (possibly even withdrawing) role of UNHCR in the Burmese refugee crisis in both countries. Moreover, BCN was informed about the increasing pressure on Burmese refugees in general and on the Rohingya population in Bangladesh in particular. BCN became worried about some specific cases of refugees threatened by the authorities in these two countries neighbouring Burma.
Generally, BCN felt that there is a lack interest for the fate of the Burmese refugees, especially those residing west of Burma, and a lack of close contacts with relevant Burmese democratic and ethnic opposition organizations in Bangladesh and India by Western pro-democracy movements. BCN strongly believes that there is a need for increasing contacts with, and knowledge about, the Burmese refugee communities in Bangladesh and India with their specific backgrounds, concerns, problems, suggestions and activities.
The representative of BCN met with a large number of different (local and national) organizations, institutions, political parties, ethnic groups, INGOs, diplomats, health workers and, of course, the Burmese refugees themselves.
Not all of the information that was collected, and certainly no names, have been mentioned in this report because of the high political sensitivity and confidentiality. The author of this report has witnessed the exceptional sensitivity and pressures from various sides during his visits of some Burmese ethnic organisations and the Rohingya-refugee camps in Bangladesh. The BCN-representative has seen with his own eyes the major differences of behaviour of the refugees between private and official meetings. The private meetings were much more relaxed, friendly and open, such as for example with refugees in Nayapara and Kutupalong refugee camps. It was in practice quite hard to organize meetings because of strong monitoring of camp authorities. The meetings with refugees in official companionship with camp authorities, were characterized by more distance, less warmth, while participants were not at liberty to speak out freely.
This report, of our latest fact-finding mission, focuses on the topic of Rohingya refugees. There are no religious or ethnic minorities in Burma who have suffered more hardships than the Rohingya Muslims in Northern Arakan State. The repression of the Burmese junta against them continues, in spite of the regular (faulty) reports by officials of the Bangladesh Government, the UNHCR, and the SPDC of course. The Rohingyas face severe difficulties in their own country, which forced them to leave. Still, small numbers of new refugees arrive in Bangladesh almost every week or month. Hundreds of thousands fled to Bangladesh in the (recent) past and although many returned of their free will or not, many others are still there. It is obvious that the Burmese junta does not like this people. The junta does not want them in Burma and tries to do whatever it can to pressurize them by causing serious difficulties. In practice, there is a clear policy of discrimination against the Rohingyas in Burma. But also in Bangladesh the Rohingyas are less and less welcome, and the pressure on them to return to their ‘homeland’ from local as well as national Government officials is certainly growing. It seems that the Rohingyas are not welcome anywhere, as if they are denied real citizenship by any state. The Rohingyas even face hostilities by the Arakanese-Buddhist people because of sensitivities of the past. Rohingyas feel pressure everywhere, and the pressure is certainly not decreasing. Rohingyas have no home, no safe place to go, no shelter and no guarantee for a safe and peaceful future anywhere, anytime.
BCN did not have the intension to write an extensive report with all details about historical topics regarding Burma in general, Arakan State, or the position of the Rohingyas. BCN just intended to write a compact report, focusing on the actual concerns and recommendations regarding the Rohingya refugees. BCN believes that there is a necessity for international donors, (Western) Governments, the European Union, etc. to use their contacts and efforts to promote positive changes that benefit the Rohingyas in Burma and Bangladesh.
Burma Center Netherlands In Arakan (Rakhine) State in Western Burma, the Burmese military regime (SPDC) and border police (NaSaKa) are still committing serious human rights violations. Although both peoples in Arakan (Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims) are victims of these crimes, especially the Rohingyas living in Northern Arakan are marginalized as a people. By definition, the Rohingyas do not have full citizenship, still suffer from gross human rights violations, are still forced to perform unpaid labour (especially in the countryside) and are not free to practice their religion. The Rohingyas in Arakan/Burma are often denied basic freedoms like the right to marry, and they are forced to pay the military authorities for all basic necessities. Rohingyas have no freedom of movement. Finally, often the military orders them to handle over all there belongings, including their land, without any compensation. The future of Rohingyas in Arakan still looks grim.
The Burmese junta accused Rohingya armed groups (fighting SPDC) of getting support of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, unsuccessfully hoping for US-support for their stance. However, there is no proof of any direct links between the Rohingya armed groups and Al-Qaeda.
In Bangladesh, some 21,000 Rohingya refugees still live in two refugee camps. They are recognized refugees by UNHCR and the Bangladeshi authorities, and could officially only be repatriated to Burma voluntarily. UNHCR is responsible for the voluntary repatriation process and the protection of the refugees in the camps. A few international organizations such as WFP, MSF and Concern render practical assistance to these refugees, including food and health care.
However, refugees as well as (inter)national parties complain about Bangladeshi camp authorities who are pressing the refugees to sign for repatriation back to Arakan/Burma. A number of refugees were highly probably repatriated because of increased, direct or indirect, pressure by the camp authorities. Refugees feel a constant pressure by the camp authorities or the mahjees. These are camp group leaders having close contacts with the camp authorities. Nowadays, almost all refugees are reluctant to repatriate because of fear about the Burmese military’s repression. In recent weeks and months, the pressure on the refugees to repatriate has increased. May 2003 saw a significant increase in the repatriation of refugees to Burma. In May, 704 refugees were repatriated. The atmosphere has grown increasingly tense now. This causes doubt and serious concern. Large numbers of refugees have openly stated to be against repatriation back to Burma because of the grave military repression in that country.
UNHCR in Bangladesh plays the complaints down, regarding the use of force and pressure by the camp authorities and mahjees, and does not seem to understand that many (inter)national parties, as well as vast numbers of refugees feel that there is a serious and increasing problem now. UNHCR does also minimize the actual repression in Arakan/Burma. This repression has been described, for example, in a number of reports by ILO, US State Department and Human Rights Watch, published over the last twelve months.
Furthermore, UNHCR has made a plan to stimulate ‘self-sufficiency’ for the remaining, recognized Rohingya refugees in the camps. This process will already get started by 1 July 2003. According to UNHCR, this is partly because of ‘donor fatigue’ resulting in decreasing funds for UNHCR’s programs in Bangladesh. The role of international organizations will be decreased, according to the plan, and the role of the Government of Bangladesh needs to become prominent. UNHCR itself plans to phase out all assistance by the end of 2004. As a first step, UNHCR will hand over the actual repatriation process to the Government of Bangladesh by the first of July, although UNHCR stresses that it will remain responsible for monitoring the voluntary aspect of repatriations. Although all (inter)national parties directly and indirectly involved are willing to cooperate with a plan to promote self-sufficiency, they all complained about the complete lack of information and consultation by UNHCR. This results in serious uncertainties among the organizations what to do in the near future. All parties are extremely worried about the fate of the refugees when international organizations are not able any more to play a ‘night watcher’s role’, to prevent any further increasing pressure on, or force toward, refugees to repatriate. Very concerning is the fact that the Government of Bangladesh still not recognizes the UNHCR plan. Even worse, UNHCR has never consulted the refugees about the plan. It seems therefore extremely unclear whether for example UNHCR’s time frame to implement the plan is realistic, and whether basic safety and even survival guarantees are included in UNHCR’s current plan.
In a second plan, UNHCR has dictated that it will ‘streamline’ the health care in the camps by 1 July 2003. Nowadays, MSF, Concern and the Bangladeshi Ministry of Health (MoH) are responsible for health care. UNHCR wants MoH to do this on its own. Again, there has not been any consultation and serious discussions about it with the involved parties. Moreover, many directly and indirectly involved parties have serious doubts whether MoH is capable (and even willing!) to guarantee the current quality level of care provided.
Apart from the officially recognized Rohingyas in the camps, there are still at least 100,000 (but maybe even 200,000 to 300,000) more Rohingyas living in Bangladesh. They are not recognized and are seen by UNHCR and the Government of Bangladesh as ‘illegal immigrants’. Many doubt if this is really true, and blame the government and UNHCR for not being willing to conduct a new investigation as to why the refugees came to Bangladesh. Almost all (inter)national actors believe that these refugees certainly had political reasons to leave Burma, because of the continuing repression. These people usually work in the informal sector as illegal, low-paid laborers and are extremely vulnerable to harassment by local people and police.
A few hundred Rohingyas, most of them residing illegally, are currently detained. Some were arrested for petty criminal offences, but more often only because of their ‘illegality’ or false accusations made by mahjees or local police. Especially the non-recognized Rohingyas in detention do not receive any legal assistance, and are often still detained although they should have been released already.
Extremely worrying is the situation of illegal refugees in the newly established Teknaf ‘makeshift camp’. More then 4,000 refugees live there under abominable conditions. They do not receive any aid and many believe that the monsoon (starting early July) will flood everything and will create a human disaster.
There are a few thousand more Rakhine-Buddhist refugees in Bangladesh. The vast majority of them live in the areas along the Burmese border and are not recognized by UNHCR. Only about 40 of them are recognized and mainly live in Dhaka. They face language problems and believe that UNHCR should extend their language and skill training to increase their chances for employment. They have also requested UNHCR to recognize more Rakhine-Buddhist refugees in the border areas, for example former members of armed groups fighting the SPDC.
Finally, the relations between both main population groups of Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists, and their representatives including politicians, intellectuals, and armed groups, are still very tense, because of historical hostilities. These sensitivities and hostilities have always been exploited by the former and current military regimes in Burma. Many organizations believe there is a need for reconciliation in Arakan, although this will be a complicated process. However, reconciliation in Arakan will also benefit a future ‘tri-partite dialogue’ between the ethnic peoples, NLD and SPDC, as well as a future democratic Burma. Reconciliation in Arakan could perhaps even prevent new waves of Rohingya refugees to neighbouring countries in the future. Very obviously, it seems that without significant political and human rights improvements in Burma, the current refugee problems will continue. Therefore, the need for political and economical pressure on the Burmese military regime, in order to force the junta to reform and democratize, is seen as utterly important by practically all refugees and Burmese organizations in Bangladesh.
4. Background Rohingya Refugees Rohingyas in BurmaOut of Burma’s population of 50 million, there are some two million Rohingyas. According to the Arakan Historical Society (AHS), there are some 200,000 more Rohingyas living in Pakistan already for some time. 500,000 more live in Saudi-Arabia. Some hundreds of thousands Rohingyas live in Bangladesh.
In Burma, the Rohingyas predominantly live in Arakan (Rakhine) State, bordering Bangladesh. After the occupation of Arakan State by the British in 1826, many Islamic Bengali settled in Northern Burma, between the Buddhist (Rakhine) population and the Islamic Arakanese (Rohingyas) who had been living there already for centuries. This immigration continued until the 1930s. From 1936 onwards, mistrust grew between Muslims and Buddhists in British Burma. This led to large-scale riots in 1942 between Muslim-Rohingyas and Buddhist-Rakhines in Arakan State, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths. Probably the later dictator Ne Win played a role in stimulating these riots. Still, the 1942 incident is widely regarded as a main reason for the current serious sensitivities between the Rohingya Muslims and the Rakhine Buddhists in Arakan State. Arakan had its own identity and it was one of the first areas where an uprising was started against (colonial and Burman) rule in 1947. Former dictator Ne Win eventually gave the Arakanese their own state within Burma, but a number of groups continued their struggle for independence. Some groups actually supported the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), and some others supported democracy or were Muslim freedom fighters.
Even nowadays, some guerrilla activities continue by some armed guerrilla groups (Rohingya organizations as well as Rakhine Buddhists groups). They are mainly fighting the SPDC for self-determination and democratic/cultural rights, in the remote forested and mountainous Bangladesh-Burma border regions.
RefugeesTensions between Buddhists and Muslims in North Arakan created serious agitation in the 1970s. General Ne Win ordered the army to suppress this, resulting in large-scale killings and plundering in 1978. Some 200,000 Rohingya-Muslims crossed the border then and fled to neighbouring Bangladesh. According to the Burmese military government, these people were only Bengalis and did not recognize them as Burmese citizens. Some 10,000 Muslims died in the refugee camps. The majority of the refugees returned to Burma after a few years.
The period 1991-92 saw a new wave of refugees who left Burma because of an increase of large-scale repression. This time, some 250,000 Muslims crossed the border. Again, the Burmese junta, now under the acronym SLORC, stated that these refugees were Bengali. As before, SLORC denied them Burmese citizenship. The Muslims settled in about 20 refugee camps. Because of intense international pressure, the majority of these refugees were permitted to return to North-Arakan State. However, they still face many serious difficulties and oppression in Burma. Every month, small numbers of new refugees from Burma arrive in Bangladesh.
Official Rohingya refugee population in BangladeshOut of the mentioned 250,000 refugees, in Southeast Bangladesh (between Cox’s Bazaar and Teknaf) there are still some 21,000 Burmese Rohingyas living in the two official remaining refugee camps of Nayapara and Kutupalong. The Rohingyas in these camps have been officially recognized by UNHCR as ‘refugees’. Therefore, UNHCR is responsible for their survival and safety. UNHCR is responsible for their protection and their eventual voluntary repatriation to Burma. Officially, no refugees are forced to repatriate to Burma. UNHCR has requested some INGOs and UN agencies to actually support the refugees in health care (MSF, Concern) and food rations distribution (WFP).
However, safety, law and order, including police, in the camps are the responsibility of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission (RRRC) under the auspices of the Bangladeshi Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief. RRRC has installed a Camp in Charge (CiC) as leading officials in both camps. Some other Bangladeshi ministries are also involved in rendering some support to the refugees, such as the Ministry of Health.
Undocumented Rohingya refugee population in BangladeshApart from the 21,000 Burmese Rohingya Muslim refugees officially recognized by the UNHCR and the Government of Bangladesh, there is an even much larger number of undocumented Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. Their number seems to be at least 100,000, but probably 200,000 (as regularly mentioned in the local Bangladeshi press) or even 300,000 (according to the Arakan Historical Society). They have no rights, no help or assistance from anyone. They are denied citizenship by the authorities of Bangladesh as well as by the Burmese junta (SPDC). The refugees mainly live under extremely difficult circumstances in the Bangladesh-Burma border areas. They often work in the informal sector (for example as rickshaw drivers) or as low paid labourers in factories without any rights. They are constantly threatened with (police) harassment. Some refugees returned to Bangladesh for other reasons and are now living as illegal residents.
Since early 2003, a new (unofficial) ‘refugee camp’ has arisen in Teknaf in the far southeast of Bangladesh. At least 4,000 refugees are living there now under horrible circumstances.
A few hundred refugees (mainly those residing illegally, but also some recognized refugees from the camps) are currently in detention. Some may have committed criminal offences such as possessing illegal arms, and others are there only because they are ‘illegal residents’ or because of arbitrary allegations of police or camp authorities.
Non-muslim Burmese refugees in BangladeshA very small Rakhine Buddhist refugee population of approximately 40 people currently lives in and around Dhaka. They fled Burma in 1988 when the democratic uprisings were quelled by the junta. Almost all of these refugees are recognized by the UNHCR, which gives them a ‘lump sum’ (small fund) to survive. Finally, there are some thousands of non-recognized Rakhine Buddhist refugees, particularly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
5. Continuing repression in Arakan, BurmaWORLDWIDE CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARAKAN STATEDuring the past 12 months, the harsh repression in Arakan (Rakhine) State was described in a number of reports by the United Nations, US State Department, ILO, and Human Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch, for example, wrote in its ‘World Report 2003’: “In the wake of international press reports alleging ties between Al-Qaeda and the Burmese government, the government launched a broad crackdown on Rohingya Muslims. (…) Tensions between the Buddhist majority and Muslim minority were still apparent in 2002, and restrictions were tightened in late 2001. Restrictions on travel by Muslims were far more rigidly enforced, especially in Arakan State, and the government limited the number of Muslims allowed to travel to Mecca for the Hajj pilgrimage. Muslims claimed they continued to have difficulties getting passports to travel abroad and in building mosques.” In its report ‘Crackdown on Burmese Muslims’ (July 2002) HRW wrote: “In Arakan State, a predominantly Muslim area, human rights violations, including forced labour, restrictions on the freedom of movement, and the destruction of mosques, have been commonplace.”
The UN-Commission on Human Rights again adopted a resolution on Burma in April 2003 on its 59th session, and included that it “strongly urges the Government of Myanmar (…) to end the systematic enforced displacement of persons and other causes of refugee flows to neighbouring countries, to provide the necessary protection and assistance to internally displaced persons and to respect the right of refugees to voluntary, safe and dignified return monitored by appropriate international agencies.”
The 2002 US State Department Country Report on Human Rights in Burma said, for example, “During the year, the regime reportedly implemented policies to consolidate the border with Bangladesh and to further control the movement of Muslim Rohingyas in Rakhine State. (…) On the country’s western border, 22,000 Rohingya Muslims remained in refugee camps in Bangladesh. More than 100,000 Rohingyas lived outside the refugee camps in Rakhine State with no formal documentation as refugees. In addition, Rohingyas who have returned to Rakhine State claimed that they faced government restrictions on their ability to travel and to engage in economic activity. (…) The Government continued to discriminate systematically against non-Burmans. Because the regime reserved secondary state schools for citizens, Rohingya Muslims did not have access to state run schools beyond primary education and were ineligible for most civil service positions. There were reports that forced labor of Muslims occurred in Rakhine State. (…) Members of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine State, on the country’s western coast, continued to experience severe legal, economic, and social discrimination. The Government denied citizenship status to most Rohingyas on the grounds that their ancestors did not reside in the country at the start of British colonial rule in 1824, as required by the country’s highly restrictive citizenship law. Persons without full citizenship faced restrictions in domestic travel. They also were barred from certain advanced university programs in medicine and technological fields.”
Last March, the ILO Liaison Officer for Burma, Mrs. Perret-Nguyen, gave a statement about the actual situation of forced labour in Burma, saying that, “The situation is really very serious and people continue to suffer from practices of forced labour. (…) The situation in areas near to the Thai border where there is continuing insecurity and a heavy presence of the army, as well as in northern Rakhine state, is particularly serious and appears to have changed little.”
UNHCR AND BANGLADESHI AUTHORITIES ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARAKANIn spite of all these documents, UNHCR in Bangladesh repeatedly stated towards refugees in the camps that the human rights situation in Arakan in ‘normalizing’, ‘improving’ and ‘stabilizing,’ for example during discussions about repatriation. A clear example of this kind of statement was made by UNHCR during an extensive camp meeting in Kutupalong on 9 April 2003. UNHCR (and the camp authorities) tried to convince the refugees to repatriate and to sign a so-called ‘affidavit’.[1][1] UNHCR did not succeed, because almost all refugees made clear that they were not willing to repatriate to Burma because of a continuing fear that the situation has not improved at all. Towards the BCN representative, UNHCR indeed recognized that the human rights situation in Burma is not well. However, UNHCR at the same time stressed that according to them, the situation has improved in the last couple of years. It felt as playing down the actual problems.
The Kutupalong – Camp in Charge (CiC) even said, “When some refugees say that they are still afraid about the situation in Burma, we tell them that now the situation in Burma is good. Refugees who were repatriated in the past are in a happy mood – we met so many repatriated families in Myanmar! – we tell the refugees here.”
FORCED LABOURMany organizations believe that the use of forced labour by the Burmese military and the NaSaKa (Burmese border police) is still significant. It seems as if there is a decrease in the enforcement of forced labour in the main towns of (Northern) Arakan State, such as in Maungdaw and Buthidaung. This is probably the result of intense ILO pressure in recent years, although one representative of a relevant Rohingya organization denied this and believed that this was mainly because almost all major infrastructure projects were completed and, therefore, there was some decrease of forced labour in the last couple of years.
At the same time, however, the enforcement of forced labour by the Burmese authorities and NaSaKa in more remote areas of Arakan State has remained unchanged. Some Burmese stressed the point that before any ILO or other international delegation arrives in Arakan to collect information regarding forced labour, the regime ‘mobilizes’ the local people to deny that there is any forced labour continuing in the area where they live.
The practice of forced labour in Arakan especially continues nearby army camps (and there are many of these), for example for the cultivation of land or the cutting of wood. Some Burmese are afraid that the military will conduct forced labour for the building of a new gas pipeline in Arakan, which is a joint project of oil companies from Burma, India and Bangladesh.
NO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENTThe junta’s control on the restriction on movement has intensified. The restriction on movement is now even worse then under Ne Win, some Buddhist Rakhines stressed. One Rohingya representative said that even two years ago, Rohingyas were still allowed to travel to for example Sittwe (Akyab, the capital of Arakan), but now even this is not allowed any more. Rohingyas are normally only allowed to travel 4 kilometers of their homes. If they want to travel to a nearby village, they need a permit of the authorities, which is often denied. Travelling for longer distances, for example to Sittwe or Rangoon is impossible for almost everyone, a Rohingya academic said.
A senior UN official, working in Burma but visiting Bangladesh, was very concerned and critical on the situation in especially North Arakan State, the main area where the Rohingyas live. He called the area “a prison for Rohingyas”. The severe restrictions on movement do also create major economic problems for the Rohingyas. Doing business, for instance, has been made virtually impossible. The Rohingyas who are financially better off have to hire Buddhist Rakhines to do business for them outside the region where they are allowed to stay. The lack of freedom of movement also causes serious limitations on the number of Rohingyas to finish their higher education. Of course, this has a negative impact for their (and their people’s) future.
No freedom of marriage SPDC introduced marriage control for Rohingyas. The SPDC has created a number of formalities to discourage marrying of Rohingyas. Rohingya couples who wish to marry have to request permission at many different levels (township administration, village, sector commander, military commander). Second, in the nine sectors of the NaSaKa, it seems that in every sector the rules are different and dependent on the individual NaSaKa commander. In every sector, not more than one or two couples get permission to marry each month. In reality, it takes a long time before permission for marriage is granted. It costs couples a lot of money for permits and bribes. Most requests for marriage are currently rejected, one Rohingya leader said.
ARBITRARY TAXES AND CONFISCATION OF PROPERTYIn recent years, the military’s control on the local economy has increased. People have to pay more bribes, such as bags of rice at military checkpoints. Even when crossing rivers, people have to pay the military for it and there is more control in this nowadays. A possible explanation for this could be the fact that the monthly salary of the military is not enough to survive, so therefore they ‘need’ to make more money in order to make ends meet.
Rohingyas have to pay arbitrary taxes on all sustainable goods. For example, there is a ‘roof tax’, a ‘men tax’, they have to pay fees if anyone dies or any new baby is born (5,000 kyats per baby). The military do also regularly confiscate land, belongings and houses of the Rohingyas. These matters are seen as the root causes for the suffering of Rohingyas by starvation.
NO CITIZENSHIPRohingyas do not receive normal (red) Burmese ID cards, but instead have white ID cards. In reality this creates serious difficulties for them, because the military put pressure on all Burmese with no normal red ID card. The white ID card is widely regarded as a discriminatory policy. Statements that Rohingyas with a white ID-card have been given normal, official Burmese citizenship by the Burmese junta, are nonsense. Rohingyas are still not seen as full Burmese citizens and are, therefore, facing severe restrictions and pressure.
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONSThere are still serious concerns about beatings, rape and even killings in Arakan by the authorities. Kaladan Press, for instance, mentioned the case of a man who was killed on 13 February 2003 by the police because he refused to perform forced labour.
UNDERMINING OF RELIGIONIn the past few years, a number of mosques were destroyed by the Burmese military. Renovation of these mosques by the local people is nearly always strictly forbidden. If people try to renovate a mosque, they seriously risk arrest.
Role of UNHCR in Arakan/Burma Many Burmese are worried about UNHCRs role in Arakan State. UNHCR’s official role is to protect the former, repatriated refugees and stimulate self-sufficieny among them. “They compromise their mandate with the regime, for example regarding the white ID-cards for Rohingyas. UNHCR should more effectively monitor the safety and self-sufficiency of the repatriated refugees,” one leader of a Rohinga organization said. A Rohingya academic believed that “All Rohingyas hoped and expected that UNHCR would guarantee their safety, but later we found out that UNHCR danced to the tunes of SPDC in Arakan and the Government of Bangladesh”. Many repatriated refugees face economic difficulties because of the pressure and problems mentioned before (forced labour, arbitrary taxes, confiscations, lack of freedom of movement).
The Burmese MI (Military Intelligence) has a close watch on UNHCR’s activities in Arakan and local employees are almost daily asked what kind of activities they did, or where they went. Foreign employees are afraid to become ‘blacklisted’ by the Burmese regime.
It seems difficult for UNHCR in Burma to actually do anything against the continuing human rights violations committed by the Burmese military.
UNHCR is currently decreasing its activities in Arakan: in recent years it decreased its financial support for International NGOs in Northern Arakan State (working on development, infrastructure and farming). At the same time, UNHCR-Burma tried to find some alternative new funds. UNHCR was at least partly successful in this, a senior UN-official from Burma told. UNHCR in Burma hopes that these NGOs could continue their work in Arakan as much as possible, although there are still some uncertainties about this for the future.
6. Burmese refugees in Bangladesh INTRODUCTIONAs mentioned before, there are Rohingya Muslim as well as Rakhine Buddhist refugees in Bangladesh. From the Rohingyas, some 21,000 refugees are recognized by the UNHCR and the Government of Bangladesh. They live in the two remaning official refugee camps Nayapara and Kutupalong in Southeast Bangladesh. All other Rohingyas in Bangladesh (between 100,000 and 300,000 people) are seen as ‘illegal immigrants’ by the Government of Bangladesh and UNHCR. They are mainly squattered in Southeast Bangladesh too and survive because of low paid (illegal) work, often in the non-formal sector.
There are some 40 Rakhine-Buddhist refugees recognized by UNHCR. They mainly live in Dhaka. A few thousand more are not recognized by anyone and mainly live in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, not far from the Burmese border.
7. Increasing pressure on the recognized Rohingya refugeesPractical organization in the official refugee camps currently UNHCR is responsible for the protection and eventual, only voluntary, repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Burma. The importance and relevance of UNHCR’s mandate in Bangladesh in obvious.
Until now, UNHCR has also been responsible for their welfare and has therefore signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and the International NGOs Concern and MSF. WFP is responsible the providing of food in both camps. They cooperate in this with the local NGO Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS), which actually transports the food from the three warehouses to the camps. During the distribution of the food to the refugees, there is always a representative of Concern or MSF monitoring this, to prevent any unfair practices. Distribution of the food to all refugees in the camps is actually performed by volunteers, refugees who receive some extra food in return for their services.
MSF and Concern are responsible for the health care of pregnant and feeding women and children under 10 years of age, in Nayapara (MSF) and Kutupalong (Concern). Concern is also trying to extend its current small-scale skills training programs for women. Concern is finally responsible for a few more programs in both camps such as tree plantations and primary education. The Bangladesh Ministry of Health (MoH) is responsible for the health care of all other refugees in the camps.
The Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission (RRRC) of the Bangladesh Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MDMR) is officially responsible for safety, law, and order in the camps. In both camps, RRRC has actually stalled a so-called a Camp in Charge (CiC) who are the leading officials for daily affairs.
FORCED REPATRIATIONUNHCR denies any forced repatriation in the camps right now. “Every refugee knows that voluntary repatriation to Myanmar is his right. The Government of Bangladesh agrees with voluntarism. I do not believe that there is any forced repatriation at all, ” a senior UNHCR representative in Dhaka said. However, he mentioned that “sometimes there are some ‘over-enthusiastic’ people in the camps.” He also added: “I don’t think people are afraid to talk with us in the camps. When I come, the refugees surround me. They give us letters and we check them all. I don’t think people feel they cannot reach us.”
UNHCR’s opinion on the possibility of any enforcement of repatriation of the refugees to Burma completely contradicts all comments made by all other local, international and Burmese parties involved, as well as the statements made by a number of individual refugees. And although, of course, it could be possible that some individuals exaggerate the actual situation, it was obvious that UNHCR has a much too naïve, rosy vision on this topic and does not recognize that there is a serious concern. A number of parties, either directly or indirectly involved, mentioned refugees complaining to their staff about pressure from camp authorities, or problems created by the mahjees (group leaders). Moreover, the camp authorities of both camps monitored (or at least tried to monitor) all movements of the BCN representative himself, who experienced a tense atmosphere. The BCN representative was not allowed by both CiCs to interview refugees without the presence of any camp officials and he was not allowed to walk around on his own.
Whenever the Government of Bangladesh is asked about the refugees (for example by UNHCR, which regularly asked the Government to give its support for its ‘self-sufficiency programme’), they always stress that, “Repatriation is the best option for the refugees.” A Dhaka University representative said: “The Government of Bangladesh will try to push the refugees back to Burma. On all levels Government officials say that refugees are on mercy here: they never really recognize their refugee rights!” A clear example of this was given during the large camp meeting in Kutupalong on April 9, where the RRRC official publicly demanded several times that the best option for the refugees is to repatriate. They had organized a meeting because the repatriation from Kutupalong had come to a complete halt in recent weeks. Like mentioned before, he used faulty arguments egarding the real situation in Arakan/Burma.
However, “the outcome was very clear and negative for RRRC and UNHCR,” a witness of the meeting explained. “Almost everyone raised both hands and said ‘no’ and ‘we don’t go’ when they were ultimately asked to sign the affidavit. In Kutupalong, nobody wants to repatriate.”
Another witness had been at some meetings in Kutupalong of UNHCR, the CiC and small groups of refugees in January 2003. “The CiC said to the refugees: ‘This is not your future here. Your future is in your own country, Myanmar. If you say “yes” to going back, you get your land back and money for half a year.’ Then the refugees replied: ‘It is not safe there for us.’ Then UNHCR said: ‘The situation is becoming normal there.’”
Refugees told about the intense pressure they felt from the camp authorities to repatriate. Especially the mahjees (group leaders) use different methods to press them to sign the affidavit and to sign that they are willing to repatriate ‘freely.’ For example sometimes the mahjees fabricate false accusations against the refugees, some mentioned that the mahjees used physical or psychological violence and others said that the mahjees and ‘volunteers’ prevent ‘unwilling’ refugees for getting sufficient rations or materials to repair their sheds. It is obvious that the mahjees have a good relationship with the camp authorities (CiC), that they monitor the activities of the refugees and tell the CiC about this. Refugees often feel afraid to complain at UNHCR’s Protection Officer, who is formally responsible for this. All foreigners (and their offices, including especially UNHCRs office with the ‘complaints box’) are also closely watched by camp authorities and mahjees. This makes it certainly more difficult for refugees to complain.
There are also concerning stories about direct involvement of the CiCs in intimidation and even violence. Some mention incidents of a few years ago, but other incidents happened more recently. One serious example was about a refugee woman who accused the CiC of Kutupalong camp of raping her on 18 February 2003. The CiC had possibly threatened her not to tell anyone about the incident. However, the victim gave a full verbal report to UNHCR and the RRRC. Later, she wrote a letter to the Minister of MDMR on March 20. In May, there was still no reply.
A press agency said that more recently they had heard about a new incident of another woman who was beaten by the same CiC.
Nobody doubts that at least some of the refugees freely decided to return to Burma. At the same time, many refugees know other people who did not repatriate voluntarily. Refugees regularly signed for repatriation but did not actually want to go. They only signed because of fear towards the mahjees and camp authorities. Many complain about this to the staff of the international organizations. “For many years we hear allegations of abuses and forced repatriation from the refugees”, one involved person explained. “We always forward these signals to UNHCR.” Some refugees said they did not complain at the UNHCR staff directly, because of fear of repercussions. They said they are being monitored all day. Some refugees manage to give letters to the international parties.
One example of a letter posted in May: The next information is that, earlier I gave five letters to you to send the correct authority. If you can do this for me I would be pleased to you. If you don’t do that then I will feel is problem. The Camp in Charge is trying to send me back to Myanmar by two or three days.
Yours,” Of course, the camp authorities deny all these stories. “There is no pressure on the refugees to repatriate,” said the CiC of Kutupalong. But then he continued: “Our Prime Minister has recently visited Myanmar to solve the refugee problem. For solving this, we are making a clearing list. We ask people to sign the affidavit.” He concluded with saying that he always explains the refugees that the situation in Burma is “very good” now.
One witness of the repatriation process at the Naf riverside, bordering Burma, explained that all the Rohingyas who were to be repatriated had to stand in a row. Then the CiC said to the witness: “All these people are happy to repatriate.” Then he asked the first man in the row: “Are you happy to repatriate?” And the man replied, looking rather anxiously, “I am happy to repatriate.”
Over the last couple of months, it seems as if the Bangladesh Government pressure on refugees is intensifying with new diplomatic contacts of the current BNP Government of Bangladesh. This government is more ASEAN and Burmese junta-oriented than the former Awami League Government. Some months ago, Burmese junta leader Than Shwe visited Bangladesh. After that, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Khaleda Zia visited Burma and certainly discussed the ‘refugee topic’.
At the camp level, it is obvious that the authorities nowadays intensify their efforts to convince the refugees to sign the affidavit. By signing this, the refugees actually declare that they agree to be repatriated. Hereby, the camp authorities and the RRRC use false arguments about the situation in Arakan.
On 21 May 2003, The Bangladeshi Daily Star wrote that, “The repatriation of Rohingya refugees resumed on Monday May 19 with the return of 123 refugees from 20 families, and another 150 refugees were expected to return today”. According to the newspaper, the refugees will be repatriated twice weekly on Monday and Wednesday, and that “officials said 21,658 refugees are still waiting for repatriation”. In May 2003, a total of 704 refugees from the two camps were repatriated. This shows that the repatriation process has clearly intensified (until early May, 2003, repatriation had significantly slowed down because of a lack of willingness of refugees to repatriate voluntarily, because of fear about repression in Burma). For some years, repatriation had been done only once a week on Wednesday. There are serious doubts about the ‘voluntariness’ of the recent intensified repatriation.
A number of external organizations expressed their concerns that if WFP, Concern and MSF are not permitted to play any more future role in the camps, a very relevant ‘night watchers role’ is missing, probably resulting in a further increasing of pressure on the refugees to repatriate to Burma against their will.
New UNHCR plan for promoting self-sufficiency for recognized Rohingya refugees In 2002, UNHCR-Bangladesh made a concept plan (‘Self-sufficiency in Bangladesh: Refugees from Myanmar’s Northern Rakhine State’) to change the efforts of support for the recognized Rohingya refugees, including:
It seems obvious to UNHCR that the vast majority of the remaining 21,000 recognized Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh will not return to their homeland for some more years, until the political and human rights situation in Burma has improved significantly. Therefore, UNHCR believes that it is of great importance to stimulate self-sufficiency for this group. Core elements of the plan include the gradual reduction of the presence of international organizations starting from July 2003; the take-over of the camp administration, including the responsibility for the assistance to the refugees, by the Government of Bangladesh by the end of 2003; and the stimulation of (at least the temporary) integration of the refugees in the local communities by income-generating programs, skills training, and education. The plan is to be completed before January 2004. The role of international organizations will have to be decreased, according to the plan, and the role of the Government of Bangladesh needs to become prominent. UNHCR itself plans to phase out all of its assistance by the end of 2004. This clause was included in the concept plan. UNHCR also stated they will close their Cox’s Bazaar Office. However, this closure was strongly denied by UNHCR officials in Dhaka and Cox’s Bazaar, which is confusing. If UNHCR is serious about closing their Cox’s Bazaar office, it would have devastating impacts on the protection and monitoring role of UNHCR, because it seems impossible to really protect refugees in the Bangladesh-Burma border regions from an office based in Dhaka.
Almost all parties and individuals who asked about this self-sufficiency plan, agreed with the necessity of a change with the current situation of the refugees in the camps. All argued that it is important to make the refugees more self-sufficient because they have no future (neither in Bangladesh, nor in Burma) if they remain dependent on food and other aid from donor organizations for many more years. It is important that as many people as possible learn to stand on their own feet and to make them more responsible for their own deeds. Also, many argued that they believe that because UNHCR faces dificulties because of lack of funds, as well as possibly ‘donor fatigue’ (although some doubt this), they have made their plan. All direct involved parties stated that they are most willing to cooperate with UNHCR to implement the plan in a responsible way. Some other parties involved said its UNHCR’s task to convince its donors to continue give support, because of the continuing problems in Burma and Bangladesh. UNHCR should therefore significantally increase its efforts to convince them that decreasing funds will create major uncertainties for the refugees.
At the same time, everybody (all international parties, Burmese groups and individuals) were extremely critical towards UNHCR about their ‘self-sufficiency plan’:
To date, nobody has seen any action or implementation plans of UNHCR. One party, for instance, stressed the importance of getting sufficient information on time about the future living situation of refugees (open or closed camps/areas, or about the location of markets where the refugees can sell their products) Even the CiC in Kutupalong complained that he did not know what kind of changes he could expect after 1 July 2003. Some bitterly felt that UNHCR was already in the process of finalizing/fixing everything without any consultation. There is also confusion about whether or not the UNHCR is planning to close its Cox’s Bazaar Office.
Still, the implementation of the plan has not been discussed with WFP, Concern, or MSF. This should be done as soon as possible, and it should be done on the right level (this means on a national, Dhaka level);
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